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Oligarchies in Spatial Environments
Lars Ehlersy and Ton Storckenz
September 2007
Abstract
In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Ar-
rows requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according
to the Lp-norm (for a xed p  1). When the policy space is multi-dimensional
and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and con-
vex, any quasi-transitive welfare function must be oligarchic. As a corollary we
obtain that for transitive welfare functions weak Pareto, independence of irrele-
vant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives
has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: D70, D71.
1 Introduction
A social welfare function is a procedure for aggregating proles of individual prefer-
ences into social orderings. Arrows theorem shows that it is impossible for a social
We acknowledge useful comments and suggestions by John Duggan, William Thomson, and
John Weymark.
yDépartement de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec
H3C 3J7, Canada; e-mail: lars.ehlers@umontreal.ca
zDepartment of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maas-
tricht, The Netherlands; e-mail: t.storcken@ke.unimaas.nl
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welfare function to satisfy weak Pareto (if all individuals strictly prefer one alternative
to another, then so does society), independence of irrelevant alternatives (the social
ranking of two alternatives only depends on the individual rankings of these alterna-
tives), and non-dictatorship when the preference domain is unrestricted. When the
set of alternatives is structured, the assumption of unrestricted domain might be un-
reasonable. One important exception of this kind are spatial environments. In spatial
environments, alternatives are points in a multi-dimensional space of issue positions
and individual preferences are continuous, quasi-concave, and have bliss points.1
There is one well-known spatial environment in which Arrows requirements are
consistent. If the number of voters is odd and the policy space is one-dimensional,
then simple majority voting is transitive and satises weak Pareto, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, and anonymity (Black ,1948; Arrow, 1951, 1963). Simple ma-
jority voting is an example of an Arrovian welfare function belonging to the following
class: if the number of voters is n, x n  1 preferences of additional constant voters,
and apply to each prole of individual preferences majority voting over this prole
and the n  1 xed voters.2 ;3
If the policy space is multi-dimensional and unbounded, and preferences are
Euclidean, then Arrows requirements are inconsistent (Border, 1984). Other proofs
show that the domain of Euclidean preferences is saturating and apply a result
due to Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) to deduce Arrows impossibility (Le
Breton and Weymark, 1996, 2000, 2002; Campbell, 19934). However, the proofs of
1An excellent review of the literature is Le Breton and Weymark (2000).
2Ehlers and Storcken (2002) provide a characterization of all welfare functions satisfying weak
Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
3For nite sets of alternatives Sethuraman, Teo, and Vohra (2003,2006) introduce an integer linear
programming formulation of anonymous and transitive Arrovian social welfare functions (ruling out
social indi¤erences). They show that any such welfare function is monotonic if and only if it is
simple majority voting with n+ 1 xed voters for any domain with no Condorcet triples and which
contains an ordering and its inversion.
4Campbell (1993) drops weak Pareto and imposes instead continuity of social preference.
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these results rely importantly on the unboundedness of the policy space. As far as we
know, Arrows theorem has not been established in spatial environments when the
set of alternatives is compact and convex. It is natural to assume that a government
faces budget constraints and therefore the set of policy alternatives becomes bounded.
We derive Arrows theorem in such spatial environments. If individual preferences
are measure distances according to a given Lp-norm and the set of alternatives has a
non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, then weak Pareto, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent, i.e. again decisiveness
of a coalition spreads from one pair of alternatives to all pairs of alternatives and
dictatorship results.
Instead of showing Arrows theorem directly, we will establish a stronger result.
Gibbard (1969) and Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972) require social orderings only
to be quasi-transitive and show that for a nite set of alternatives with an unrestricted
domain any quasi-transitive welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives must be oligarchic. This means that there exists a
non-empty coalition S (called the oligarchy) such that an alternative a is socially
strictly preferred to another alternative b if and only if all members of the oligarchy
agree that a is strictly preferred to b. Our main result shows the following: if individ-
ual preferences individual preferences are measure distance according to the Lp-norm
and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex,
then any quasi-transitive welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence
of irrelevant alternatives must be oligarchic.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our notation and the
main denitions. In Section 3 we state that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the policy space is compact,
convex, and at least two-dimensional. In Section 4 we introduce oligarchic welfare
functions and give our main result: any quasi-transitive welfare function satisfying
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives must be oligarchic. Section
3
5 contains the proof of our main result. Section 6 concludes.
2 Notation and Denitions
We use the same terminology and notation as Le Breton and Weymark (2000). Let
R denote the set of real numbers and Rm denote the m-dimensional Euclidean space.
Let N  f1; 2; : : : ; ng denote a nite set of agents with n  2, and let A  Rm
denote a set of alternatives. Each point in Rm identies the changes in the level of m
di¤erent policies, for example public spending on police, health care, and so on.
LetW denote the set of all complete, reexive, and transitive relations over A. An
element of W is called a weak ordering over A. Let Q denote the set of all complete,
reexive, and quasi-transitive relations over A. An element of Q is called a quasi
ordering over A.
Given Ri 2 Q, the corresponding strict relation, Pi, and the indi¤erence relation,
Ii, are dened as follows: for all a; b 2 A, (i) aPib, :bRia, and (ii) aIib, aRib and
bRia. Note that if :aRib, then by completeness of Ri, aRib. Hence, :bRia is enough
to describe the strict relation Pi. Recall that Ri is transitive if for all a; b; c 2 A,
aRib and bRic ) aRic; and Ri is quasi-transitive if for all a; b; c 2 A, :bRia and
:cRib) :cRia.
Let R  W denote an individuals preference domain. A (preference) prole is
a list R  (Ri)i2N 2 RN . A (social) welfare function assigns to each prole a quasi
ordering over A. Any welfare function f is a mapping f : RN ! Q such that for all
R 2 RN , f(R) 2 Q. We call f(R) the social ordering (that f assigns to R). As f(R)
is quasi-transitive for all R 2 RN welfare function f is said to be quasi-transitive.
We call a welfare function f transitive if it is a mapping f : RN ! W such that
for all R 2 RN , f(R) 2 W
Note that social orderings need not belong to the individual preference domain
R. Other authors impose the restriction that any social ordering belongs to each
individuals preference domain (for example, Peters, van der Stel, and Storcken, 1992,
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and Bossert and Weymark, 1993).
Arrows requirements are as follows. The rst axiom says that if all agents strictly
prefer a to b, then a should also be socially strictly preferred to b.
Weak Pareto: For all R 2 RN and all a; b 2 A, if for all i 2 N , aPib, then :bf(R)a.
Given R 2 RN , X  A, and j 2 N , let RjjX denote the restriction of Rj to
X, and RjX  (RijX)i2N . The second axiom says that the social ordering of two
alternatives only depends on the prole of individual preferences restricted to these
two alternatives.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all R; R 2 RN and all a; b 2 A,
if Rjfa; bg = Rjfa; bg, then f(R)jfa; bg = f( R)jfa; bg.
A welfare function is Arrovian if it satises weak Pareto and independence of ir-
relevant alternatives. A welfare function is dictatorial if there exists some agent such
that for each prole the social strict preference relation respects the strict preference
relation of this agent.
Non-Dictatorship: There exists no i 2 N such that for all R 2 RN and all
a; b 2 A, if aPib, then :bf(R)a.
Arrows Theorem shows that for transitive welfare functions, weak Pareto, inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are incompatible if the set
of alternatives is nite and the individual preference domain R contains all strict
orderings over the set of alternatives.
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3 Arrows Theorem for Multi-Dimensional Policy
Spaces
Throughout we consider environments where the set of alternatives is multi-dimensional
and connected with respect to the standard topology on Rm. Let A  Rm be a set
of alternatives such that the relative interior of A in Rm is non-empty. A preference
relation Ri 2 W is Lp-single-peaked if there exists a bliss point p(Ri) 2 A such that
for all a; b 2 A, aRib, ka  p(Ri)kp  kb  p(Ri)kp (here k  kp denotes the Lp norm
in Rm for a given p > 1)5. In case p = 2 the L2-single-peaked preferences are also
called Euclidean. Let Rp denote the set of all Lp-single-peaked preferences over A.
Note that p remains xed throughout.
For the special case of A = Rm and the Euclidean norm, Border (1984) and Le
Breton and Weymark (1996) establish Arrows theorem for transitive welfare func-
tions. For A = Rm+ , Le Breton and Weymark (2000, 2002) show Arrows theorem
for transitive welfare functions. However, all these results rely importantly on the
unboundedness of the set of alternatives. In real life, policy makers face budget
constraints and these results do not apply.
A corollary of our main result will be the following theorem: Arrows requirements
are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty and connected interior and
it is contained in the closure of its interior (i.e. its boundary has no tails).
Let int(A) denote the interior of A in Rm and cl(A) the closure of A in Rm.
Theorem 1 Let A  Rm be such that int(A) 6= ;, int(A) is connected, and A 
cl(int(A)). If m  2, then for transitive welfare functions weak Pareto, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent on the domain RNp .
In particular, Theorem 1 yields Arrows theorem for compact and convex sets of
policy alternatives with non-empty interior.
5For any x 2 Rm we have kxkp = (xp1 + xp2 +   + xpm)1=p
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If the interior of the set of alternatives is non-empty and not connected, then an
Arrovian social welfare function may not be dictatorial.
Example 1 Let m  2, p  2, A1  [0; 1]  [0; 1], A2  [0; 1]  [9; 10], and A 
A1[A2. For all R 2 RN2 , let f(R)jA1 = R1jA1, f(R)jA2 = R2jA2, and for all a 2 A1
and all b 2 A2, f(R)jfa; bg = R1jfa; bg. Then f is a transitive Arrovian welfare
function satisfying non-dictatorship.
The conclusion of Example 1 does not remain true if the sets A1 and A2 are
connected through a line segment, for example if A = A1 [ A2 [ [(0; 0); (0; 10)]. For
this set of alternatives an Arrovian welfare function must be dictatorial.6
If the boundary of A contains tails, then again an Arrovian welfare function may
not be dictatorial.
Example 2 Let m  2, p  2, N  f1; 2g, B  [0; 1] [0; 1], and L  ](0; 1); (0; 2)].
Let A  B [ L. For all R 2 RN2 and all a; b 2 A, (i) if a; b 2 L, a2 < b2, and for
some i 2 N , aPib, then :bf(R)a, and (ii) otherwise, f(R)jfa; bg = R1jfa; bg. We
show that f is a transitive welfare function.
Claim: For all R 2 RN2 , f(R) is transitive.
Proof of Claim. If p(R1) 2 B, then f(R) = R1. Let p(R1) 2 L and a; b; c 2 A.
If a; b; c 2 B or a; b; c 2 L, then it is easy to check that f(R)jfa; b; cg is transitive.
If a 2 L and b; c 2 B, then f(R)jfa; b; cg = R1jfa; b; cg and f(R)jfa; b; cg is tran-
sitive. Let a; b 2 L and c 2 B. Then f(R)jfa; cg = R1jfa; cg and f(R)jfb; cg =
R1jfb; cg. Obviously, if f(R)jfa; bg = R1jfa; bg, then f(R)jfa; b; cg is transitive. Let
f(R)jfa; bg 6= R1jfa; bg. Without loss of generality, suppose that a2 < b2. Thus, by
(i), :bf(R)a, and a2  p2(R1). Then aP1c and :cf(R)a. Hence, f(R)jfa; b; cg is
transitive. 
6By Theorem 2, f jA1 and f jA2 are dictatorial. Because A1 and A2 are connected through the
line segment [(0; 0); (0; 10)] it follows from Theorem 1 that the dictator of f jA1 and f jA2 is the same
and f is dictatorial.
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Now it is easy to check that f is a transitive welfare function satisfying weak
Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship.
4 Oligarchies
Above any welfare function satised transitivity. Below social orderings are only
required to be quasi-transitive. In order to formulate our main result, we need to
introduce the notion of decisiveness and oligarchies.
Given ; 6= S  N and a; b 2 A, we say that S is decisive over a preferred to bif
for all R 2 RNp we have :bf(R)a whenever aPib for all i 2 S. Let D(a; b) denote the
set of all coalitions that are decisive over a preferred to b. We say that S blocks
a preferred to bif for all R 2 RNp we have bf(R)a whenever bPia for all i 2 S. Let
B(a; b) denote the set of all coalitions that block a preferred to b.
Let f be a welfare function and S be a non-empty coalition. Then f is called
oligarchic with oligarchy S if for all a; b 2 A such that a 6= b we have S 2 D(a; b)
and fig 2 B(a; b) for all i 2 S. In other words, for oligarchic welfare functions a is
socially strictly preferred to b if and only if all members of the oligarchy strictly prefer
a to b. Note that f is dictatorial if there exists i 2 N such that f is oligarchic with
oligarchy fig. It is easy to check that oligarchic welfare functions satisfy weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives and that the chosen social orderings are
quasi-transitive.
Our main result establishes that oligarchic welfare functions are the only quasi-
transitive welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant
alternatives if the set of alternatives has a non-empty and connected interior and it
is contained in the closure of its interior.
Theorem 2 Let A  Rm be such that int(A) 6= ;, int(A) is connected, and A 
cl(int(A)). If m  2, then oligarchic welfare functions are the only quasi-transitive
welfare functions satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives
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on the domain RNp .
We show Theorem 2 in the next section. Theorem 1 will be an immediate conse-
quence of Theorem 2.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
Let f be a welfare function satisfying weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant
alternatives on the domain RNp . Given X  A, let fX denote the restriction of f
to the set of alternatives X. Formally, for all R 2 RNp such that for all i 2 N ,
p(Ri) 2 X, let fX(RjX)  f(R)jX. It is straightforward that fX inherits weak
Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives from f .
We introduce additional notation. Let a; b; c 2 Rm be three distinct alternatives.
Let [a; b] denote the line segment between a and b, i.e. [a; b]  fa + (1   )b j 2
[0; 1]g. Let H(a; b) denote the surface of points with equal distance to a and b. This
surface bisects [a; b]. In the non-degenerate case, when a, b, and c are non-collinear,
the surfaces H(a; b), H(a; c), and H(b; c) determine six disjoint open subspaces, say
space(abc), space(acb), space(bac), space(bca), space(cab), and space(cba) (see Figure
1 for Euclidean preferences in R2). We named these spaces such that for all Ri 2 Rp,
p(Ri) 2 space(acb), aPicPib and likewise for the other spaces. Note that the collec-
tive boundary of space(abc) and space(acb) is a subset of H(b; c). Let space(a(bc)) =
space(abc)\ space(acb) that is the set of all points x 2 H(b; c) such that for Ri 2 Rp,
if p(Ri) = x, then aPibIic. Note that H(a; b) \H(a; c) \H(b; c) 6= ; and fa; b; cg is
a free triple in the domain Rp if H(a; b) \H(a; c) \H(b; c) \ int(A) 6= ;. Then the
domain Rp contains all conceivable rankings of a, b, and c. Let d and u be two points
in Rm such that for all coordinates j 2 f1; 2; :::;mg dj  uj. Let box(d; u) = fx 2
Rmj for all coordinates j 2 f1; 2; :::;mg, dj  xj  ujg denote the hyper box between
d and u. Let cpbox(d; u) = fx 2 Rmj for all coordinates j 2 f1; 2; :::;mg, dj = xj or
xj = ujg denote the set of corner points of box(d; u). Now for every triple of these
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corner points, say a; b and c, m 2 H(a; b)\H(a; c)\H(b; c), where m = 1
2
d+ 1
2
u the
middle of [d; u]. If box(d; u)  int(A), then any triple of its corner points is a free
triple.
Given a 2 Rm and  > 0, letJ(a; ) denote the open ball with center a and radius
, i.e.
J
(a; )  fx 2 Rm j ka  xkp < g. Given a; b; c 2 Rm, let plane(a; b; c) denote
the plane spanned by a, b, and c, i.e. plane(a; b; c)  fa+(b a)+(c a) j;  2 Rg.
Let v and w be two points belonging to the boundary of
J
(a; ), i.e. ka   vkp = 
and ka   wkp = . The circular arc between v and w on
J
(a; ) in plane(a; v; w) is
denoted by arc(a; v; w).
Lemma 1 Let a 2 int(A) and b 2 A such that a 6= b. Let  > 0 be such thatJ
(a; )  int(A). Then there exist c 2J(a; ) and d 2 int(A) such that for all c0 2
arc(d; a; c), fa; b; c0g is a free triple in Rp.
Proof. Because int(A) is connected and A  cl(int A), on a path from a to b0, a
point arbitrarily close to b, we may choose d 2 H(a; b) \ int(A). Further, as d 2
int(A) we may choose d such that it does not belong to [a; b]. Then a, b and d are not
collinear. Because d 2 int(A), we have for some 0 > 0,J(d; 0)  int(A). Now choose
c 2 J(a; )\ plane(a; b; d) such that c belongs to the boundary of J(d; ka   dk).
For c0 2 arc(d; c; a) we have that H(a; b) \ H(a; c0)\ plane(a; b; d) = fdg. Thus,
H(a; b) \H(a; c0) \H(b; c0) \ plane(a; b; d) = fdg. Since d 2 intA, the two previous
facts imply that for all c0 2 arc(d; c; a), fa; b; c0g is a free triple in Rp. 
The following is a direct consequence of Blair and Pollack (1979).
Lemma 2 Let a; b; c 2 A be such that fa; b; cg is a free triple in the domain Rp.
Then f fa;b;cg is oligarchic.
Now if fa; b; cg is a free triple in the domain Rp, then let ; 6= Sfa;b;cg  N be such
that f fa;b;cg is oligarchic with oligarchy Sfa;b;cg. Note that any oligarchy is uniquely
determined, i.e. if f fa;b;cg is oligarchic with oligarchies S1 and S2, then S1 = S2.
10
The next lemma establishes that f is oligarchic on any open ball, which is con-
tained in the interior of A.
Lemma 3 Let a 2 int(A) and  > 0 be such thatJ(a; )  int(A). Then there exists
S  N such that , fJ(a;) is oligarchic with oligarchy S.
Proof. Let d; u 2 (a; ) be such that dj  uj for all j 2 f1; : : : ;mg and box(d; u) J
(a; ). Every triple a0; b; c 2 cpbox(d; u) is a free triple in Rp. Thus, by Lemma 2,
f fa
0;b;cg is oligarchic, say with oligarchy Sfa0;b;cg. The same holds for any other triple
of corner points fa00g of box(d; u). But then Sfa0;b;cg = Sfa00;b;cg. Now it is immediate
that f cpbox(d;u) is oligarchic with oligarchy Sfa0;b;cg. Since this is true for any hyper
box in
J
(a; ) and the triples of corner points of those are connected, i.e. there are
sequences of triples of corner points of boxes starting with one triple and ending with
another triple, whose subsequent members have at least two points in common, it
follows that f
J
(a;) is oligarchic with oligarchy Sfa;b;cg. 
Lemma 4 There exists a non-empty S  N such that for all a 2 int(A) and all
b 2 A, with a 6= b, f fa;bg is oligarchic with oligarchy S.
Proof. First we proof the following: for all a 2 int(A), there exists a non-empty
Sa  N such that for all b 2 Anfag,
f fa;bg is oligarchic with oligarchy Sa. (1)
In order to proof this claim, let a 2 int(A) and b; b0 2 A be such that a, b and b0 are
distinct. It is su¢ cient to prove that f fa;bg and f fa;b
0g are both oligarchic with the
same oligarchy.
Lemma 1 implies that there exist c; c0 2 J(a; )  int(A) such that ka   ck =
ka   c0k and both fa; b; cg and fa; b0; c0g are free triples. Thus, by Lemma 2, both
f fa;b;cg and f fa;b
0;c0g, respectively, are oligarchic with oligarchy Sfa;b;cg and Sfa;b0;c0g,
respectively. By Lemma 3 and a; c; c0 2J(a; ), Sfa;b;cg = Sfa;b0;c0g, which implies (1).
11
In order to nish the proof of Lemma 4, let a; a0 2 int(A). By (1), it is su¢ cient
to show Sa = Sa0. If a = a0, then this is trivial. If a 6= a0;then by (1) we have f fa;a0g
is oligarchic with oligarchies Sa and Sa0. Therefore, Sa = Sa0, the desired conclusion.
Theorem 2 will follow from our nal lemma.
Lemma 5 There exists a non-empty S  N such that f is oligarchic with oligarchy
S.
Proof. By Lemma 4, f intA is oligarchic, say with oligarchy S. Let a; b 2 An int(A).
First, we show S 2 D(a; b). Let R 2 RNp be such that aPib for all i 2 S. Let
R0 2 RNp be such that for all i 2 S, p(R0i) = a, and for all i 2 NnS, R0i = Ri. Because
A  cl(int(A)), there exists c 2 int(A) such that for all i 2 S, aP 0i cP 0i b. By Lemma
4, we have both S 2 D(a; c) and S 2 D(c; b). Thus, both :cf(R0)a and :bf(R0)c,
and by quasi-transitivity of f , :bf(R0)a. By R0jfa; bg = Rjfa; bg and independence
of irrelevant alternatives, :bf(R)a. Because R was arbitrary, we obtain S 2 D(a; b).
Second, we show fjg 2 B(b; a) for all j 2 S. Suppose to the contrary that for some
R 2 RNp we have both aPjb and :af(R)b. Partition N as follows: V = fi 2 N jbPiag,
U = fi 2 N jaIibg, and T = fi 2 N jaPibg. Obviously, j 2 T .
Because A  cl(int A), we may choose a0 2 int(A) arbitrarily close to a and b0 2
int(A) arbitrarily close to b. Because int(A) is connected, there is a path : [0; 1]  !
int(A) from a0 to b0 such that (0) = a0 and (1) = b0. Because a0 is arbitrarily close
to a and b0 is arbitrarily close to b, we may assume that H(a; b) separates a0 and b0.
Thus, for some t 2 [0; 1] (t) 2 H(a; b). Since  is continuous, t1  minft 2 [0; 1] :
(t) 2 H(a; b)g is well-dened. Let d  (t1).
Next we show space(adb) \ A 6= ;. The surface H(a; b) divides Rm in two open
(half-)spaces Ha  fx 2 Rm : ka  xkp < kb  xkpg and Hb  fx 2 Rm : kb  xkp <
ka  xkpg. Note that (t) 2 Ha for all 0  t < t1. Because a0 is arbitrarily close to a,
we may assume that H(a; d) separates a0 and d. Now  also connects a0 and d. Thus,
for some 0  t0 < t1 we have (t0) 2 H(a; d) \ Ha: Since (t0) 2 int(A), it follows
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that
J
((t0); )  int(A) for some  > 0. Because (t0) 2 H(a; d) \ Ha it follows
that H(b; d) separates b and (t0): Hence,
J
((t0); )\ space(adb) 6= ;.
Let R0 2 RNp be such that for all i 2 V , p(R0i) 2 intA is close to d and
ka   p(R0i)kp > kb   p(Ri)0kp; for all i 2 U , p(R0i) = d; and for all i 2 T , p(R0i) 2
space(adb) \ A. Then for all i 2 V , dP 0i bP 0ia; for all i 2 U , dP 0i bI 0ia; and for all
i 2 T , aP 0idP 0i b. By weak Pareto, :bf(R0)d. By R0jfa; bg = Rjfa; bg, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, and :af(R)b, :af(R0)b. Hence, by quasi-transitivity of
f , :af(R0)d. By d 2 int(A) and Lemma 4, f fa;dg is oligarchic with oligarchy S, a
contradiction to fjg 2 B(d; a) and aP 0jd. 
Finally, we show Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Obviously, if f satises the requirements of Theorem 1, then
f satises the requirements of Theorem 2. Hence, by Theorem 2, f is oligarchic with
some non-empty oligarchy S. If jSj = 1, then f is dictatorial and Theorem 1 is true.
If jSj  2, then let j 2 S and a; b; c 2 int(A) be such that fa; b; cg is a free triple in
the domain Rp. Obviously, the existence of such a triple is guaranteed by int(A) 6= ;
and Lemma 1.
Then let R 2 RNp be such that aPjbPjc and bPicPia for all i 2 Nnfjg. By
weak Pareto, :cf(R)b. Because f is oligarchic with oligarchy S and j 2 S, we have
j 2 B(a; b). Thus, by aPjb, af(R)b. Then from transitivity of f(R) and :cf(R)b we
obtain :cf(R)a. Since for all i 2 Nnfjg, we have cPia, this implies fig =2 B(a; c) for
all i 2 Nnfjg. This contradicts jSj  2 and f is oligarchic with oligarchy S. 
6 Conclusion
As the careful reader may have observed, for the proof of Theorem 2 it is crucial that
for any hyperbox box(d; u), any triple of its corner points is free in the domain Rp.
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This property is also true for other domains such as Lp-single-dipped preferences: a
preference relation Ri 2 W is Lp-single-dipped if there exists a worst point d(Ri) 2 A
such that for all a; b 2 A, aRib , ka   d(Ri)kp  kb   d(Ri)kp. Let Dp denote the
set of all Lp-single-dipped preferences. Single-dipped preferences play an important
role for the location of public bads such as waste deposits or nuclear power plants.
Similarly to the domain Rp, a, b, and c is a free triple in the domain Dp if and only
if H(a; b)\H(a; c)\H(b; c) \ int(A) 6= ;. Now the proof of Theorem 2 can be easily
modied to show Theorem 2 for quasi-transitive welfare functions dened over the
domain DNp .
Other domains for which Theorem 2 holds include the domain of Lp-separable
preferences: a preference relation Ri 2 W is Lp-separable if there exists a bliss point
p(Ri) 2 A and i > 0 for i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, such that for all a; b 2 A, aRib ,Pm
i=1 ijai p(Ri)ijp 
P
i=1 ijbi p(Ri)ijp. LetRsp denote the set of all Lp-separable
preferences. For Lp-separable preferences, Theorem 2 can be either shown directly by
modifying its proof or via showing that Lp-separable preferences are isomorphic to Lp-
single-peaked preferences. This means there is a continuous bijective transformation
' on Rm such that
(
mX
i=1
ijai   bijp)1=p = k'(a)  '(b)kp
for all a; b 2 Rm. The function ' can be simply dened by by 'i(a) = 1=pi ai for all
i 2 f1; : : : ;mg. Then Theorems 1 and 2 can be rephrased for this class of isomorphic
distance functions because weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives
are preserved by bijective transformations.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the sets \(abc), \(acb), \(bac), \(bca), \(cab), and \(cba)
for non-colinear a, b, and c in R2.
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